The New Tax Legislative and Regulatory Process by Kysar, Rebecca
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
The New Tax Legislative and Regulatory Process 
Rebecca Kysar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
National Tax Journal, December 2020, 73 (4), 1135–1162
THE NEW TAX LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS
Rebecca M. Kysar
This paper compares the enactment and implementation process for the 2017 Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) to prior tax reform acts, as well as situates it within other 
developments in the legislative process more generally. It details how the 2017 enact-
ment process solidifies reconciliation as the primary vehicle for the enactment of 
major tax measures, a trend nearly two decades in the making. The ambitious scope 
of the TCJA, as well as the rushed and partisan reconciliation process by which it 
was enacted, has led to ambiguities and instability in the legislation. These features 
have, in turn, posed an enormous implementation challenge for Treasury, which has 
led to some troubling results. Finally, reconciliation has set up the opportunity for 
Congress to engage in budget gimmicks in the future. This paper discusses these 
trends and proposes solutions to them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax lawmaking has never been elegant. Special interests, budget rules, and brute politics have long contorted the tax code, supplanting the traditional tax policy 
criteria of simplicity, equity, and efficiency with less pure aims. The 2017 Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (TCJA), the largest overhaul of the nation’s tax laws since 1986, continues 
in this tradition, with its favored industries, revenue-forced trade-offs, and, at times, 
indefensible policy choices.1 The TCJA, however, is the culmination of a shift in the 
landscape. Reconciliation is now the primary vehicle for the enactment of major tax 
measures, a trend nearly two decades in the making. The 2017 process was notable in 
Rebecca M. Kysar: Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY, USA (rkysar@fordham.edu) 
https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2020.4.10
1 Section 199A, for instance, has all three of these qualities. The passthrough deduction is only available to 
certain industries, expires in 2025 due to budget pressures, and has been characterized as “incoherent and 
unrationalized industrial policy, directing economic activity away from some market sectors and toward 
others, for no good reason and scarcely even an articulated bad one” (Shaviro, 2018, p. 49).
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that it was the first instance reconciliation was used to enact complex tax reform. As a 
fast track process, however, reconciliation was not up to the challenge.
The ambitious scope of the TCJA, as well as the rushed and partisan reconciliation 
process by which it was enacted, led to ambiguities and instability in the legislation.2 
It has also posed an enormous implementation challenge for Treasury, which has led 
to some troubling results. Treasury has issued taxpayer-friendly regulations in contra-
vention of the statute, benefiting multinational corporations and large businesses while 
further weakening an already flawed system. 
Going forward, Congress should exercise careful oversight of Treasury’s imple-
mentation of the tax laws so that it does not continually tilt toward the connected 
and well-funded. Creative solutions to this problem exist, such as rescission of the 
regulation, the appointment of an ombudsman to protect the public interest in rulemak-
ing, making more transparent different avenues for participating in the rulemaking 
process, highlighting the budgetary costs of irresponsible rulemaking, requiring more 
detailed disclosure of tax liability, and simply delegating less through more precise 
statutory drafting. These changes can help further democratic legitimacy and protect 
revenues.
Reconciliation also has created opportunities for budget gimmicks. The rules of 
reconciliation forced a series of sunsets and sunrises to meet budget goals, causing tax 
cuts to expire or tax increases to spring into life at arbitrary points in time. If history is 
any guide, however, extending the temporary tax cuts of the TCJA will go unpaid for 
and the future tax increases will never go into effect. 
Looking ahead, the trend of using reconciliation for tax reform may be short-lived. If 
the legislative filibuster falls, reconciliation will no longer be necessary to enact legisla-
tion on party lines. This would greatly diminish the role of the budget process, having 
implications for tax laws as well as the larger fiscal system. If that is the case, baking 
budget goals directly into tax legislation may be an alternative. In the meantime, there 
are ways to shore up the budget rules, such as stabilizing the budget baseline, which 
would diminish the effectiveness of budget gimmicks borne out of the reconciliation 
process.
This paper explores these trends and possibilities. Section II provides background on 
the reconciliation process and a general overview of the TCJA’s enactment. Section III 
explores the implementation of the TCJA and recounts instances of Treasury overreach. 
For interested readers, this section provides detailed analysis of whether and where the 
new regulatory regime deviates from the statute. Mastering the details of Section III, 
however, is not necessary to follow the reminder of the paper. Section IV discusses 
what the tax legislative and regulatory process may hold in the near future and offers 
ideas for improvement.
2 Arguably, the rushed and partisan aspects of the process would have occurred with or without reconciliation. 
If reconciliation was not an option, Congress would likely be under pressure to eliminate the filibuster, 
as discussed in Section IV. Rushed and partisan legislation may then become the norm. Kysar (2013b, 
p. 2121) argued in prior work, however, that reconciliation has paved the way for the eradication of the 
legislative filibuster by steadily eroding the norms of the Senate.
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II. ReCONCIlIaTION aND The eNaCTmeNT Of The TCJa
a. Background on the Reconciliation Process
The budget reconciliation process allows for limited debate and amendments, bypass-
ing the Senate filibuster. Although it was originally envisioned in the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 as a modest tool that would align legislation with revenue and 
spending targets set forth in the budget resolution,3 it has since risen in importance. In 
the 1980s, as reconciliation legislation became more common, concern over abuse of 
the process began to rise. One of the original drafters of the Budget Act, West Virginia 
Senator Robert Byrd, led the charge toward safeguarding the process with the enact-
ment of the “Byrd rule,” which prevented the Senate from considering reconciliation 
legislation with “extraneous provisions.”4
Given the procedural advantage that reconciliation bestows, the minority party fre-
quently invokes the Byrd rule to challenge provisions outside the reconciliation process. 
President Clinton seized upon reconciliation in the 1990s in order to enact significant 
policy changes. During this era, the Republican minority heavily relied upon the Byrd 
rule’s protections (Kysar, 2013, pp. 2132–2133). One of the most notable effects of the 
Byrd rule occurred in 2001, when Senate Republicans wished to enact a historically large 
tax cut through reconciliation. Up until then, reconciliation had only been used to enact 
revenue-increasing or revenue-neutral legislation. Senate Democrats argued that the use 
of reconciliation for tax decreases violated the thrust of the original Budget Act, which 
“made it quite clear that the purpose of reconciliation was for deficit reduction” (Byrd, 
2001, pp. S5651–S5652). The Republicans eventually won the procedural fight after the 
senate parliamentarian ruled that reconciliation could be used so long as the tax cuts were 
sunsetted. The sunsets allowed the legislation to comport with the Byrd rule’s requirement 
that legislation not increase the deficit in any period beyond the budget window.5 Thus, 
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 contained provisions 
that would return tax rates to their pre-2001 levels in 2011. Republicans would use the 
sunset tactic to enact future tax cuts through reconciliation, both in the Jobs Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 20036 and again in the TCJA. In addition to these tax 
acts, reconciliation was used by the majority party to enact the Tax Increase Prevention 
and Reconciliation Act of 2005,7 as well as parts of the Affordable Care Act of 2010.8
3 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(c), 88 Stat. at 315.
4 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 20,001, 100 Stat. 82, 
390–91 (1986). The Byrd rule defines a provision as “extraneous” if it (A) does not produce a change in 
outlays or revenues; (B) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the 
reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution; (C) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that 
reported the provision; (D) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the non-
budgetary components of the provision; (E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified 
in the budget resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); or (F) recommends changes to Social Security. Id. 
5 2 U.S.C. § 644(E) (2012). 
6 Pub. L. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752.
7 Pub. L. 109-222.
8 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152 (2010).
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B. The Implications of Reconciliation for the TCJa
Reconciliation, thus, has been used to enact major tax acts since the early 2000s. 
The TCJA is notable, however, in that the tax provisions in these earlier reconciliation 
tax acts were far less ambitious in scope. It may therefore be more useful to compare 
the TCJA process with that of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the last complex overhaul 
of the tax code. 
The TCJA was enacted through the reconciliation in a matter of weeks without a single 
Democratic vote or even a hearing. In contrast, Congress considered the bipartisan 1986 
reform over the course of three years. In the bipartisan 1986 reform, members from both 
sides of the aisle painstakingly put together the legislation — and only after Treasury 
produced a 262-page report on the contours of the new tax plan, the Ways and Means 
Committee heard testimony from more than 450 witnesses, and the Senate Finance 
Committee held 33 days of hearings (Leibenluft and Huang, 2017).
TCJA proponents would say that the reform process was years in the making, ever 
since the Republicans gained control of the House in January 2011, and that the bill 
was subject to regular order in that it was marked up in committee. But major, complex 
provisions of the bill, for instance, the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT), had not 
been vetted in open hearings at all. And those prior hearings did not have the benefit of 
the legislative text or even the bill’s broad strokes. The choice to use reconciliation to 
enact the TCJA had several problematic implications, which derive from the fact that 
the process was being used to enact complex tax legislation (as opposed to simple rate 
cuts). I discuss these below. 
1. Importance of Estimates/Budget “Gimmicks”
First, reconciliation heightens the role of the revenue estimates. The reconciliation 
instructions cap the overall cost of the legislation, and the Byrd rule disallows deficit-
reducing provisions in years outside the budget window.9 The budget rules lead to 
what Graetz (1995, p. 609) once called “paint by numbers” lawmaking. Revenue needs 
contour the final product, displacing the traditional tax policy criteria of simplicity, 
efficiency, and equity. 
The costly lowering of the corporate rate presented a challenge for compliance with the 
Byrd rule. Several tactics were explored to cover the estimated $1.3 trillion in revenue 
over the budget window period including a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) 
that would bring in a great deal of revenue inside the budget window (Auerbach, 2017). 
The DBCFT met strong headwinds from industry representatives and was abandoned 
early in the process. Republicans also pursued a longer budget window of 20 or 30 years 
(as opposed to the traditional 10-year window) so that a sunset date for the corporate 
rate cut could be much further off, potentially overcoming the downsides of a temporary 
9 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 20,001, 100 Stat. 82, 
390–91 (1986).
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cut (Kapur, 2017). In the end, however, Republicans also rejected this tactic, perhaps 
because a temporary corporate rate cut would have affected revenues for many years 
after the expiration date.10 To be in compliance with the Byrd rule, a corporate rate cut 
would have to be sunsetted well within the budget window period, regardless of the 
length of the window (Kysar, 2018b, pp. 61, 75).
During the 2017 process, Republican lawmakers also signaled they were considering 
changing the budget baseline to one of “current policy” in order to fit tax cuts within 
the parameters of reconciliation. The current official baseline is described as a “current 
law” baseline because it generally follows current law as written, with some exceptions 
(Kamin, 2015, pp. 143, 154–155). The parameters of a current policy baseline are less 
defined, but it was clear that the intention was to assume the continuation of several 
expiring tax provisions (better.gop, 2016, p. 16). This change would have rendered 
the $460 billion costs associated with extension costless (Kamin and Kysar, 2017, 
p. 125). 
Despite much discussion of the current policy baseline, Republicans ultimately 
adhered to the current law baseline in the budget resolution, perhaps because the senate 
parliamentarian took the position that any such baseline also had to apply to new tax 
cuts that expire, as well as old ones. Rhetoric surrounding the current policy baseline, 
however, heavily influenced the legislation. Key Republicans described the $1.5 tril-
lion tax cut figure agreed upon in the budget resolution as accommodating $500 billion 
of revenue from a current policy baseline (in addition to an estimated $1 trillion from 
dynamic growth) (Hanlon & Rowell, 2017). Indeed, pivotal players, such as Senators 
Flake and Corker, made public statements that the current policy baseline influenced 
their vote in favor of the TCJA.11
There was also growing pressure to ditch reliance upon the independent congressional 
estimators — Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) — and instead rely on nontraditional 
estimates, possibly from the Treasury Department. Attacks on the estimators began in 
conjunction with health care reform earlier in the year. During the first half of 2017, 
Republican criticism against the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was so intense 
that eight former CBO directors wrote a letter to congressional leaders objecting to the 
attacks.12 Ultimately, the lawmakers respected the JCT’s official score. 
To summarize, the budget rules remained intact but some norms were destabilized 
in the process. The TCJA also revealed some fault lines such as the budget window, 
10 The JCT estimated that a three-year corporate rate cut would have produced nonnegligible revenue losses 
beyond the 10-year budget window period, seven years after the sunset date. Letter from Thomas A. Barthold, 
Chief of Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives 
(April 25, 2017), at http://www.politico.com/f/ ?id=0000015b-a645-d0b0-afdb-b7c7e71d0001. This is 
because companies would shift profits to years in which the lower rate was in effect (Kysar, 2018b, p. 75).
11 Hanlon and Rowell (2017) referencing statements by Senators Flake and Corker that rely upon a current 
policy baseline in justifying their support for the tax bill, revenue losses notwithstanding. 
12 Letter from Former CBO Directors on the Importance of CBO’s Role in the Legislative Process to Paul 
Ryan, Speaker of the House, et al. (July 21, 2017),  https://medium.com/ @douglas.elmendorf/letter-from-
former-cbo-directors-on-the-importance-of-cbos-role-in-thelegislative-process-278863b7e1c6.
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the baselines, and the independence of the estimators. Under a different scenario, a 
longer budget window could have served the goal of longer sunsets and, thus, may be 
deployed in the future. Although Republicans adhered to the current law baseline, they 
invoked an alternative baseline to justify costlier legislation. Similarly, at the outset, 
they relied upon dynamic growth to rationalize the size of the tax cuts, although the 
official dynamic estimates would later prove to be unhelpful to their cause.13 Although 
Republicans adhered to the JCT estimates, they came close to discarding them.
Ultimately, Republicans relied on tried and true mechanisms of fitting large tax cuts 
within reconciliation. Many of the TCJA’s provisions, especially on the individual side, 
sunset in 2025 in order to keep the costs within reconciliation’s parameters.14 Addition-
ally, tax increases that do not spring to life until future years, in particular with regard 
to the international provisions, aim to bring in revenue later.15 The sunrise provisions 
will face a lot of opposition from industry and may never go into effect. For example, 
the excise tax on high-cost employer medical plans was a sunrise provision and has 
been delayed twice (Van de Water, 2019).
The sunsets that were used in the bill to meet the requirements of reconciliation 
will create the need for new legislation in the next few years. The Bush tax cuts were 
largely extended without being paid for by creating an exemption from the pay-go 
rules, which require offsets for tax cuts.16 The same tactic may be pursued to extend the 
TCJA’s temporary provisions. The rhetoric of the current policy baseline could obscure 
the costs of renewing the popular provisions in the TCJA, which in turn may pave 
the way for permanency of the new expiring tax cuts with an exemption from pay-go 
rules. 
Moreover, the temporary nature of the provisions is, at times, antithetical to the poli-
cies at which they are aimed. The TCJA, for instance, allows companies to expense 
or deduct capital expenses in full in the year in which they were incurred, as opposed 
to having to depreciate the cost over a number of years. Expensing is designed to 
increase capital investment, thereby growing the economy, but temporary expensing 
mutes these effects.17 
13 The parliamentarian reportedly disallowed using dynamic scoring for reconciliation (Clifton, 2017). JCT’s 
official dynamic score of the conference bill projected an increase of deficits by $1.1 trillion, a modest 
improvement over the conventional score of $1.5 trillion over the same budget window period. Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, Macroeconomic Analysis of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act,” JCX-69-17,  https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5055.
14 See, for example, 26 U.S.C. § 1(j) (sunsetting the rate tables in 2025). The sunsets occurred in 2025, rather 
than the end of the budget window, because this kept the costs within the $1.5 trillion figure set out in the 
budget resolution. The Byrd rule requires that legislation comply with the reconciliation instructions and 
that reconciliation legislation does not increase deficits beyond the budget window period.  
15 See, for example, 26 U.S.C. § 250 (reducing the deduction for GILTI after 2025).
16 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 911, 126 Stat. 2313 (2012) (ordering that 
the Act’s budgetary effects be ignored for pay-go purposes). 
17 The Tax Foundation estimated that permanent expensing would grow the economy by 1.6 percent after a 
decade but that temporary expensing would do so only by 0.18 percent (Pomerleau, 2017).
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In many senses, then, reconciliation gave us the worst of both worlds. The destabiliz-
ing of budget norms paved the way for Republicans to agree upon an inflated number 
in the reconciliation instructions, which functions as a ceiling and a floor for tax cuts 
(Aprill and Hemel, 2018, pp. 99, 129). That number forced a patchwork of temporary 
and delayed provisions that increase uncertainty for taxpayers and hamper economic 
growth without actually producing fiscal responsibility. 
2. Partisan Legislation and Instability
Tax reform should be somewhat durable if it is going to create proper investment 
incentives. Reconciliation, however, tends to produce temporary legislation, not only 
because of the revenue-forced sunsets but also because of the fact that it is a partisan 
process. One consequence to circumventing the Senate filibuster through reconciliation 
is the production of immoderate legislation, which has a greater likelihood of being 
altered by a later majority. 
The argument that a supermajority rule leads to more moderate decision-making has 
been made in the judicial nominee context. Due to the need to appease the “pivotal 
senator,” or the senator whose support the president needs to secure a supermajority 
vote, rather than the median, or the 51st senator, supermajority rules lead to an agree-
ment closer to the median senator, that is, to a more moderate agreement (McGinnis 
and Rappaport, 2005, pp. 257, 261–281). This analysis can extend to the legislative 
context, where supermajority rules produce laws that are more closely aligned with the 
ideology of the median senator. 
Bipartisan buy-in ensures that the minority will not act to quickly undo the legislation 
when it regains Congress. Using reconciliation, however, meant that Republicans did not 
need to secure even one Democratic vote during the TCJA process. This was in contrast 
to past tax overhauls that involved support from the minority party. The past three tax 
reform acts, for instance, occurred during times of divided government, outside of the 
reconciliation process.18 Even the 2001 Bush tax cuts were supported by 12 Democratic 
senators. A bipartisan process would have produced more moderate, and hence more 
stable, policy. Instead of a 21 percent corporate rate cut that is likely to be undone if 
Democrats regain control of Congress, Democrats and Republicans likely would have 
enacted a more modest rate cut with staying power. The many sunset provisions in the 
TCJA will themselves further destabilize the legislation going forward. 
The partisan aspect of the TCJA process also illustrated another shortcoming of 
using reconciliation for tax reform. When one party is supporting a policy, it is dif-
ficult to produce the requisite level of revenues. This is because no one party wants to 
be blamed for hardships caused by increased taxes and decreased spending, which are 
often more salient to voters than the abstract goal of deficit reduction. Bipartisanship 
18 “[I]t may not be coincidental that the three tax acts that have garnered the ‘tax reform’ label have all 
occurred during periods of divided government when bipartisan compromise was necessary” (Yin, 2006, 
pp. 977, 1031).
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is often thought of as a necessary ingredient to tax reform so that one party alone does 
not get blamed for taking away special tax benefits or otherwise raising taxes on one 
industry or another. If the parties together took on the goal of fiscal responsibility and 
reducing special interest provisions, then difficult choices to effectuate that goal would 
be more politically palatable. The TCJA, instead, is estimated to produce a revenue loss 
of $1.9 trillion over 10 years, significant stimulation to an economy that was arguably 
near full capacity. On net, it also actually increased the number of tax expenditures in 
the Code (Bellafiore, 2018). 
3. Diminishment of Tax Institutions
Reconciliation also tends to sideline the tax institutions when it comes to policy forma-
tion as compared to their role in earlier eras. The need to come up with reconciliation 
instructions in the budget resolution means that the party leaders heavily influence the 
bill at the outset. This reduces the policymaking role of Treasury and the tax writing 
committees. Although the estimating power of the JCT is essential to the reconciliation 
process, this serves to weaken its role in policy formation by channeling its resources 
to the estimating function. The expertise that the tax institutions could bring to bear on 
the legislation is greatly diminished through the reconciliation process. 
4. Mistakes and Ambiguities
There are inevitable mistakes and ambiguities in tax legislation when the process is 
cut short. As discussed above, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 evolved over the course of 
two years, and prior tax reform efforts had similar or longer time frames for debate, 
consideration, and drafting.19 In contrast, the TCJA was enacted in a matter of weeks. 
Tax law is a notoriously complex area of the law with many interconnected parts, and 
the rushed drafting of the TCJA produced a number of errors and ambiguities, sometimes 
with billions of dollars at stake.
One justification for a rushed process is that it gives interest groups less time to work 
their magic on politicians. The TCJA, in some respects, performed well in this regard. 
It does not contain the notorious “rifle shot” provisions, which benefit single taxpay-
ers or industries, that riddled the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Nonetheless, it would be a 
mistake to think that the legislation does not respond generously to business interests. 
International base broadening provisions were the quid pro quo for the low corporate 
tax rate. Unfortunately, the base broadeners failed to reduce meaningfully profit shift-
19 Birnbaum (1988) chronicling the 1986 tax overhaul. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, in which the tax 
treatment of bankrupt taxpayers was clarified, took nearly four years after “extensive debate and comment” 
(Handler, 1987, pp. 1259, 1262–1263). The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, which eliminated the 
double taxation of closely held corporations on an elective basis, was enacted after two and a half years 
of consideration. Id.
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ing, making for a costly trade.20 The new 21 percent corporate tax rate loses significant 
revenue.21 Moreover, it is an overly generous reduction of the overall tax burden on 
corporate income when one takes into account that many institutional shareholders 
are tax-exempt (thus eliminating the shareholder burden of the corporate double tax) 
and that expensing currently eliminates taxation on the normal return on capital. TCJA 
proponents cited competitiveness concerns as the reason for lowering the rate. Prior 
to the TCJA, however, there was little actual evidence that U.S. corporations were 
competitively disadvantaged (Clausing, 2020a). 
One question is whether courts will take into account the rushed process by which the 
TCJA was enacted in considering its error-ridden and ambiguous provisions and Trea-
sury’s implementation of it. Whether, for instance, they will be forgiving in interpreting 
the text. There is some precedent for this. In King v. Burwell, the Court considered the 
question of whether a sloppily drafted tax provision in the ACA, providing for health 
insurance subsidies purchased through the “Exchange[s] established by the State” 
included insurance through state and federal exchanges or just the former. The Court 
ultimately construed the phrase at issue liberally to encompass federal exchanges. In 
so doing, the Court recognized the streamlined process by which the Act was enacted, 
reasoning that reconciliation took away “care and deliberation that one might expect 
of such significant legislation” resulting in “inartful drafting.”22 
20 The TCJA adopted a 10.5 percent minimum tax on certain foreign income of foreign subsidiaries to combat 
incentives for multinational corporations to shift their profits offshore under the TCJA’s new quasi-territorial 
regime. The design of the minimum tax, however, largely preserves profit shifting incentives as compared to 
pre-TCJA law (Kysar, 2018a). Specifically, the minimum tax currently allows multinationals to blend their tax 
credits from high and low tax countries, thereby incentivizing profit shifting toward both types of jurisdictions. 
Applying the minimum tax on a per-country basis would foreclose the existing ability of corporate taxpayers 
to offset their U.S. tax liability of foreign income in low-tax countries with foreign tax credits on income from 
high-tax countries. Clausing (2020b) estimates that a per-country minimum tax reduces haven profits by 23 
to 31 percent as compared to 12 to 16 percent under a global minimum tax. Additionally, the generous GILTI 
deduction taxes foreign income at half the rate of domestic income, encouraging profit shifting. Decreasing 
the effective rate differential between the two types of income would decrease incentives to shift profits. 
Prior minimum tax proposals set the minimum tax rate at 67 percent of the regular corporate rate. The White 
House and Department of the Treasury, The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform: An Update 
4 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-
Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf. Finally, the 10 percent exempt deemed return on assets is 
arbitrary and too high given that the average risk-free rate of return has been much lower. This encourages the 
shifting of tangible assets, such as manufacturing assets, from the United States to offshore locations in order 
to obtain the benefit of the exemption. Instead, the exempt return could be eliminated, or the rate could be 
pegged to a dynamically adjusting market interest rate or lowered to something closer to the risk-free return 
on Treasury yields. Leaving aside the one-time transition tax, the JCT’s score for the international provisions 
in the TCJA indicated a $14 billion revenue loss for the 10 years subsequent to enactment. Estimated Budget 
Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” JCX-67-17 (December 18, 
2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
21 Note that a corporate rate increase to 28 percent would raise approximately $730 billion over 10 years 
(Batchelder and Kamin, 2019).
22 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). For discussion of this issue, see Kysar (2021).
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King v. Burwell is also notable for a different reason. Surprisingly, the Court refused 
to follow Chevron to defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) interpretation, 
which comported with the Court’s ultimate holding. The Court held that Chevron did 
not apply because there was no implicit delegation from Congress to the IRS when there 
is a question of “economic and political significance.”23 This brings us to the next part 
of the paper, which focuses on Treasury’s implementation of the TCJA. 
III. TReaSURY’S ImPlemeNTaTION Of The TCJa
The ambitious scope of the TCJA, as well as the rushed process in which it was 
enacted, has posed an enormous challenge for Treasury, which is charged with interpret-
ing and implementing the legislation. Several dynamics weigh this process in favor of 
sophisticated taxpayers, particularly those that have resources to influence the regulatory 
process. In several cases, Treasury has weakened the anti-base erosion features in the 
TCJA in the face of intense lobbying for business interests. Troublingly, many of these 
regulatory giveaways have no statutory basis.24 
Recently, the CBO made a downward technical adjustment of $110 billion, largely 
attributed to the law’s international provisions, including from Treasury’s regulations 
and new financial data (CBO, 2020b, pp. 73–74).25 Although the CBO does not pro-
vide further information on which international regulations might be contributing to 
this downward adjustment in revenue, below, I discuss some areas where the Treasury 
regulations have been overly generous to corporations, perhaps in ways that the score-
keepers did not anticipate in their initial estimate of the law. 
a. The TCJa Regulatory Process
Given the complexity of the new TCJA regime, its truncated legislative process was 
bound to create problems. Treasury was left in the position of interpreting and imple-
menting hastily drafted provisions that interacted with old law in sometimes unforeseen 
ways. This opened the door for taxpayers with resources to exercise significant influence 
over the regulatory process, which lacks safeguards against such abuse. Even when 
career staff at Treasury protested proposed regulatory rules on the basis they lacked 
statutory authority, political appointees within Treasury reportedly dismissed their 
concerns (Drucker and Tankersley, 2019). This illustrates that institutional safeguards 
cannot always withstand political pressures to pursue policy objectives.26
23 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
24 These developments were not unforeseen. Prior to the TCJA’s enactment, academics and other commenta-
tors warned of their possibilities given the inherent design flaws in the legislation, the rushed manner in 
which it was passed, and the foreseeable dynamics in the regulatory process. See, for example, Kamin et 
al. (2017).
25 See also CBO (2020a) reiterating that the revisions reflected, in part, implementation of the law, “including 
regulations announced by the Internal Revenue Service over the past year.”
26 Although Treasury may change course in the future upon an administration change, there are political 
costs to doing so given the reliance interests on the initial interpretations. 
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In order to protect the administrative state against democratic deficiencies, adminis-
trative law mandates that an agency must provide notice of proposed regulations and 
grant the public an opportunity to comment on them. Yet nothing prevents sophisticated 
actors from rushing directly to agency officials in hopes of catching their ear prior to 
this “notice and comment” period. These prenotice communications, which are not 
transparent to the public, benefit from first-mover advantage (Oei and Osofsky, 2019, 
p. 209).27 If a special interest can influence Treasury toward a favorable interpretation 
initially, it is likely that interpretation carries over into the final regulations (Oei and 
Osofsky, 2019). 
In the case of the TCJA, sophisticated parties clearly benefitted from these nontrans-
parent first-mover advantages. Before the ink was dry on the TCJA, business actors and 
representatives swarmed Treasury to advocate for their interests (Oei and Osofsky, 2019). 
Treasury officials reportedly met with lobbyists for companies and industries roughly 
10 times a week (Oei and Osofsky, 2019). At crucial turns, Treasury acquiesced to their 
demands, sometimes in contravention of clear statutory language. Notable examples of 
this can be found throughout the regulations implementing the new international tax 
provisions, Section 199A, and the opportunity zone incentives. 
These first-mover advantages compound the greater participation that sophisticated 
parties already have in the formal notice and comment period. In the tax context, industry 
actors tend to dominate the formal notice and comment process. This is because they 
have resources to deploy and because they stand to gain more from a favorable inter-
pretation than any particular member of the public stands to lose from it. Furthermore, 
members of the public who are disadvantaged by Treasury giveaways to sophisticated 
taxpayers likely do not have standing to challenge such giveaways under current law.28 
Tax practitioners and bar associations are further constrained by client interests from 
making anti-taxpayer comments (Shay, 2019, pp. 1129, 1145). These resource and 
incentive differentials generally result in few, if any, public-oriented comments in the 
regulatory process.
The phenomena of delivering regulatory benefits to taxpayers without clear statutory 
authority is an old problem of bipartisan pedigree. During the financial crisis of 2008, 
for instance, the Bush-era IRS issued guidance that allowed multi-billion-dollar relief 
27 Importantly, courts do not require transparency of prenotice activity. Some of this activity can be recon-
structed after the fact due to press reports, Treasury’s own references to it in its notice of proposed rule-
making, and information released related to Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)/Office 
of Management and Budget review. Id.  
28 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that 
he could not “imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax 
liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else”); 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984) (denying taxpayer standing for a challenge to the tax exemption 
of segregated schools); DaimerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-46 (2006) (denying standing 
for third party challenges to state and local tax breaks); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 
U.S. 587 (2007) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge favorable administrative decisions, contrary to 
the statute, under First Amendment grounds). For a discussion of these issues, see Hemel (2017, p. 633), 
Sugin (2016, p. 617), and Zelenak (2012, pp. 829–855).
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from Section 382’s loss limitations on acquired companies.29 The guidance was tailored 
purportedly to facilitate the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo. The Obama-era 
IRS continued this approach to extend similar benefits to the Treasury Department upon 
a sale of its shares of General Motors, again without statutory support.30
The rushed and unorthodox manner in which Congress now legislates, however, cre-
ates more ambiguous and imperfect tax provisions than in the past (Kysar, 2013, pp. 
2121, 2018, 61; Oei and Osofsky, 2019). In this new legislative environment, Treasury 
and the IRS will be under tremendous strain to provide guidance quickly to taxpayers. 
Exploring ways in which Congress can help protect against agency capture and demo-
cratic deficiencies is more pressing than ever. 
The below examples are a nonexhaustive list of TCJA regulations that go beyond 
the text of the statute. 
B. examples of Treasury Overreach from the International Provisions
1. GILTI
a. The high-Tax excepTion elecTion
The new 10.5 percent minimum tax on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) on 
certain foreign source income allows corporations foreign tax credits for 80 percent of 
foreign income taxes. This generally means that no GILTI liability ensues if a taxpayer 
pays a tax rate of at least 13.125 percent abroad.31 
Shortly after GILTI was enacted, however, tax experts quickly noticed that GILTI 
liability may occur even when the foreign tax rate exceeds 13.125 percent (Sullivan, 
2018, p. 845). This is because, in determining the foreign tax credits, expense alloca-
tion rules require that some expenses that generally have worldwide benefits (such as 
research, interest, and overhead) have to be allocated, in part, to reduce foreign source 
income (and, hence, their foreign tax credits) even though they are incurred in the 
United States. These rules, thus, strive to better match income with economic reality 
and to prevent taxpayers from improperly inflating their foreign source income to reduce 
their tax liability. In circumstances where such expenses are allocated to foreign source 
income, taxpayers may have GILTI tax liability even when they are paying a foreign 
effective tax rate exceeding 13.125 percent. 
Taxpayers who were unhappy with this result lobbied Treasury to implement a high-
tax exception that would eliminate GILTI tax liability whenever a taxpayer paid at least 
a 13.125 percent effective tax rate. In proposed regulations, Treasury acquiesced to 
their demands, specifically citing comments they had received from taxpayers in their 
decision to do so. For reasons explained below, however, Treasury granted the high tax 
29 IRS Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905. 
30 IRS Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251.
31 Eighty percent of 13.125 percent equals the GILTI rate of 10.5 percent, thereby completely offsetting 
GILTI liability.
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exception only for those taxpayers paying at least an 18.9 percent rate abroad who elect 
into the exception.32 In doing so, Treasury exceeded its statutory authority.
The route that Treasury used to justify the high-tax exception is through the subpart 
F regime, which requires current inclusion of generally passive income at the full 21 
percent corporate rate, as opposed to the GILTI rate of 10.5 percent. Subpart F has a 
high-tax exception for certain categories of Subpart F income (specifically “foreign 
base company” income and “insurance company” income) taxed at a foreign rate that 
is more than 90 percent of the regular 21 percent corporate rate (or 18.9 percent). The 
new GILTI statutory provisions state that income excluded from Subpart F by reason 
of this preexisting high-tax exception (in addition to subpart F income generally) is 
also excluded from GILTI.33 Treasury seized upon this cross-reference as a means to 
provide corporate taxpayers with what they wanted. Unfortunately, the language of the 
cross-reference cannot bear the meaning given to it by Treasury.
Specifically, the GILTI cross-reference carves out from the definition of income 
subject to GILTI:
[A]ny gross income excluded from the foreign base company income (as 
defined in section 954) and the insurance income (as defined in section 953) 
of such corporation by reason of section 954(b)(4) [the high-tax exception in 
subpart F].34 
The clear reading of this language — indeed the only reasonable reading of it — 
excludes from GILTI only that income that would otherwise be foreign base company 
or insurance income but for the high-tax exception in subpart F. In the regulations, 
however, Treasury has twisted the words of the statute to exclude any income, be it 
within the enumerated categories or not, so long as the income is subject to an 18.9 
percent or higher rate abroad. Effectively, Treasury’s strained reading adds the follow-
ing nonsensical language to the statute:
[A]ny gross income excluded from the foreign base company income (as 
defined in section 954) and the insurance income (as defined in section 953) 
of such corporation by reason of section 954(b)(4) as well as any income that 
would have been excluded by reason of that subsection but for the fact that it 
did not constitute foreign base company income and insurance income.
Treasury justified its statutory reading by noting in the Preamble to the regulations that 
there is nothing in Section 954(b)(4) that restricts its application to income that “first 
qualifies as” foreign base company income or insurance income but, instead, that sub-
32 Guidance under Section 958 (Rules for Determining Stock Ownership) and Section 951A (Global Intangible 
Low-Taxed Income), 84 Fed. Reg. 29114 (June 21, 2019) [hereinafter Proposed GILTI Regulations].
33 26 U.S.C. § 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(III) (2018). 
34 Id. 
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section applies to “any item of income received by a controlled foreign corporation.”35 
The language Treasury quotes from the statute reads in full: “foreign base company 
income and insurance income shall not include any item of income received by a 
controlled foreign corporation” that is taxed at the requisite high rate. No school of 
statutory interpretation would construe this language to include income other than those 
two enumerated categories. As Shay (2019, p. 1139) has succinctly reasoned, “under 
the statutory language, you do not even get to Section 954(b)(4) unless the income in 
question would otherwise be Subpart F foreign base company income or insurance 
income, so income excluded from Section 951A ‘by reason of’ Section 954(b)(4) can-
not be read to cover any other income.” 
Not only does Treasury’s reading go beyond the clear terms of the statute in this 
regard, Treasury went further to create a taxpayer election where one does not exist in 
the statute. Tax elections always serve to benefit the taxpayer since the taxpayer will 
only elect when it is in its interest to do so (Field, 2010, pp. 21, 30–31). In this situation, 
the election is extremely taxpayer friendly, since some taxpayers with income subject to 
high foreign tax rates would prefer to follow the statute and report the GILTI inclusion 
along with the related foreign tax credits, while other taxpayers would prefer to make 
the election in the regulations and exclude the income from GILTI. Neither the text nor 
the legislative history justifies this result.36
35 Proposed GILTI Regulations, Preamble. 
36 In the Preamble, Treasury echoed taxpayer arguments that the GILTI high tax exclusion election comports 
with legislative history. S. Comm. on the Budget, Committee Recommendations as Submitted to the Com-
mittee on the Budget Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 71, S. Print No. 115-20, at 371 (2017). It is a basic tenet 
of statutory interpretation that clear text trumps legislative history. This is even more so the case when 
the legislative history is ambiguous at best. The legislative history invoked by Treasury states that items 
of income excluded from GILTI “include income subject to high levels of foreign tax.” This statement 
likely references the category of income excluded by means of Section 954(b)(4) rather than contemplates 
a broad high-tax exclusion from GILTI. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history refers to electivity, 
which as noted above is far better for taxpayers than a mandatory exclusion of high taxed income from 
GILTI. Treasury itself recently stated in the Preamble to the final foreign tax credit regulations that Con-
gress intended the expense allocation rules of the Code to apply to GILTI income. Guidance Related to 
the Foreign Tax Credit, 84 Fed. Reg. 69022 (December 17, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The 
principal effect of the high-tax exclusion is to avoid the adverse consequences to taxpayers of such expense 
allocation. It is impossible to reconcile Treasury’s acknowledgment of Congress’ intent to require expense 
allocation with Treasury’s claim that the high-tax exclusion is consistent with Congressional intent.  In 
addition, it is hard to imagine that Congress intended that foreign income that is subject to a foreign tax 
rate of 18.9 percent or above is eligible for the high-tax exemption and, therefore, exempt from expense 
allocation and any additional U.S. tax but that foreign income subject to a foreign tax rate below 18.9 
percent is subject to expense allocation and, therefore, to a total U.S. and foreign tax in excess of 21 
percent. Finally, some may point to the title of the section itself, “Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income,” 
as evidence of congressional intent to only tax income subject to a low tax rate abroad. A heading cannot 
limit the plain meaning of the text and “has no power to give what the statute takes away.” Trainmen v. 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947); Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 
175 (2009). Even if we take an unorthodox view that the title of a statute may trump its operative text, the 
GILTI acronym itself is a misnomer in other respects. Although the title refers to intangible income, the 
statute applies the minimum tax to income from both tangible and intangible assets. And, of course, the 
statute does not contain the term “election.” Moreover, this argument assumes its conclusion in that the 
“low-taxed income” term could accommodate the expense allocation regime. The “income” portion of the 
phrase could be understood to represent true income net of properly allocated expenses.
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b. The calculaTion of The exempT ReTuRn in gilTi
Although the high-tax exception to GILTI is perhaps the most egregious example of 
Treasury making a gift to taxpayers, in derogation of statutory language, the regulations 
implementing the international regulations contain other examples. 
In determining GILTI, the statute allows the taxpayer to exclude a deemed 10 per-
cent return on tangible assets held abroad, as measured by tax basis. This exclusion, 
however, is reduced by the interest expense of the controlled foreign corporation. The 
more interest expense allocated to the deemed return, the lower the net deemed return 
and the greater the GILTI liability. Taxpayers, thus, wish to reduce the amount of inter-
est allocated under the statute. Treasury has contravened the words of the statute by 
allowing the taxpayers to net all of their interest income against interest expense, rather 
than just the interest income received from related parties as is required by the statute 
(Rosenbloom, 2019, pp. 219, 290–291). This rule reduces the amount of interest expense 
they have to subtract from the exempt deemed return, and, in turn, decreases their GILTI 
liability.37 
2. Bank Relief from the BEAT
In addition to the GILTI regime, the TCJA also created the new BEAT, which is a 
minimum tax regime that applies to certain domestic corporations that make deductible 
payments to foreign affiliates. Specifically, the BEAT requires that a U.S. corporation 
calculate its normal corporate tax liability at the 21 percent rate and then recalculate its 
liability by adding back in certain deductible payments to related parties, such as inter-
est, royalties, and service payments, but at a 10 percent rate. If the latter recalculation 
exceeds the regular tax liability, the corporation owes the additional amount.38
The BEAT applies to foreign banks that lend money to their U.S. affiliates in order 
to meet American regulatory requirements, that is, before Treasury decided otherwise. 
Specifically, the clear statutory language of the BEAT encompasses the interest paid 
from the U.S. entities to their foreign parent companies. The new rules did not incor-
porate any kind of test that hinged on taxpayer intent to avoid taxes. Congress instead 
chose bright-line rules for this anti-abuse regime. Thus, the regulatory impetus behind 
the banks undergoing these transactions is irrelevant under the statute.
A few large foreign banks, including Credit Suisse and Barclays, reportedly lob-
bied Treasury for relief from the BEAT (Drucker and Tankersley, 2019).39 Treasury 
granted their request in the form of an exception for interest payments on debt issued 
by domestic “global systemically important banking organizations” where the debt is 
37 Guidance Related to Section 951A (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income), 83 Fed. Reg. 51072 (October 
10, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
38 26 U.S.C. § 59A (2018).
39 Records from OIRA indicate that representatives of Credit Suisse continued to meet with Treasury of-
ficials about the BEAT regulations in September 2019, although the precise topic of the meeting was not 
disclosed. See Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, EO 12866 Meeting 1545-BP36 (Septem-
ber 27, 2019), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/viewEO12866Meeting?viewRule=true&rin=1545-
BP36&meetingId=4533&acronym=1545-TREAS/IRS.
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issued in response to requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve to minimize the 
risk of insolvency.40
Treasury, in later regulations and again in response to business interests, expanded 
the nonstatutory exception to apply to foreign and not just domestic institutions so long 
as they are subject to regulations similar to those issued by the Federal Reserve in the 
domestic context. Further, Treasury expanded the exemption for domestic institutions 
by allowing a buffer amount of excluded payments on interest on debt that exceeded the 
Federal Reserve’s regulatory requirements. In doing so, Treasury officials responded to 
industry arguments that banks regularly issued securities above the regulatory require-
ments in order to accommodate changing balance sheets.41
Treasury justified these exceptions, which have no roots in statutory text, by the 
specific grant of authority in § 59A(i), which, like many other Code provisions, directs 
Treasury to “prescribe such regulations or other guidance as may be necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this section.” Notably, this is distinct from 
more expansive grants of authority where Congress instructs Treasury to “carry out the 
purposes” of the section.42 This narrower grant of authority does not allow Treasury to 
contravene the requirements of the section by creating new exceptions to the minimum 
tax.43 
In later communications, a Treasury spokesperson would defend the bank carve-out, 
stating that, “[w]e were responsive to job creators” (Drucker and Tankersley, 2019). This 
statement does not obviate Treasury’s duty to abide by the law and, instead, indicates 
that the notice and comment process is, in fact, being dominated by special interests 
who are undermining the rule of law. 
Treasury’s unilateral foreign bank relief will likely cost billions in revenue. Officials 
at the JCT put the revenue loss of exempting international banks at up to $50 billion, 
which is nearly a third of the BEAT’s projected revenue collection (Drucker and Tank-
ersley, 2019). UBS, which lobbied for the regulatory changes, reported in its public 
filings that it expected to owe no BEAT liability due to regulations “that were considered 
helpful to foreign banks.”44 
40 Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax, 83 Fed. Reg. 65956 (December 21, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). This is not the only example of special interest influence on the BEAT regulations. Treasury ini-
tially issued a rule that would have disallowed a complex currency transaction designed to circumvent 
the BEAT. It later withdrew the rule after objections from The Organization for International Investment, 
which represents foreign multinational corporations Nestle and LyondellBassell (Drucker and Tankersley, 
2019).
41 Preamble, Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax, 83 Fed. Reg. 65956 (December 21, 2018) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
42 See, for example, 26 U.S.C. 1298(g).
43 Moreover, even if a court were to construe this grant of authority to encompass purpose, the purpose of 
Section 59A appears to be to limit earnings stripping through an override of the arm’s length principle. 
If Congress had wished to allow non-tax-motivated transactions to escape taxation, it could have simply 
deferred to the transfer pricing regime. Additionally, the five examples of appropriate regulations set forth 
in the specific grant of authority are aimed at preventing taxpayer avoidance of the statute. The interpre-
tive principle of ejusdem generis would suggest that Congress envisioned the Treasury Regulations under 
BEAT to be in this ilk. Treasury has instead issued guidance aimed at abetting taxpayer avoidance.
44 UBS Group AG, Report of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K) (January 21, 2020).
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C. examples of Treasury Overreach from the 199a Regulations
Section 199A is a new tax deduction for passthrough entities and sole proprietors. It 
attempted to appease noncorporate business interests that did not receive the benefit of 
the reduced corporate rate. The provision contains guardrails to narrow its scope, the 
efficacy of which was widely questioned prior to the enactment of the TCJA (Kamin 
et al., 2017). The scope of these guardrails has been the subject of intense lobbying 
in the regulatory process, with Treasury adopting lenient stances in the face of such 
pressure (Oei and Osofsky, 2019). Overwhelmingly, the comments received in both 
the pre- and formal notice period were from industry or business interests rather than 
those representing the public interest.45
Section 199A provides up to a 20 percent deduction on “qualified business income.” 
The deduction is denied for taxpayers with income above certain amounts if the business 
is providing services within certain categories (health, law, consulting, and financial, 
among others). In addition to these specified services, the statute also denies the deduc-
tion to a catch-all category of trade or businesses whose principal asset is the “reputa-
tion or skill” of the owners or employees. This catch-all clause, as written, should have 
significantly narrowed the application of the 199A deduction. 
The final 199A regulations, however, come close to reading the catch-all clause out 
of the statute. Under the regulations, the clause only applies to fact patterns in which 
an individual or pass-through entity is engaged in the trade or business of receiving 
income from endorsements, the licensing of an individual’s likeness or features, and 
appearance fees. The regulations, thus, essentially strike “skill” from the catch-all clause 
by focusing only on narrow circumstances that involve reputation. 
The regulations go further to also grant the deduction if reputation is combined 
with skill. For instance, the regulations contain an example of a well-known chef who 
receives profits from restaurants as well as a fee for endorsing cookware. According to 
the regulations, the restaurant income receives the deduction, whereas the endorsement 
fee does not.46 Here, the chef remains entitled to the deduction for the restaurant income 
presumably because the chef is generating returns in the restaurant by mixing labor with 
reputation (Kamin, 2018). But this result is in contravention of the statute, which limits 
the deduction if the principal asset of the business is attributable to reputation or skill.47 
45 For instance, of 337 comments received in the formal notice period, Oei and Osofsky counted only six 
that represented the public interest (Oei and Osofsky, 2019, p. 36). See also Wallace (2017, pp. 179, 182) 
(finding private interests dominating the tax notice and comment period).
46 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-5(b)(3)(xv). 
47 In the preamble to the regulations, Treasury and the IRS justified this narrow interpretation based on the 
concern that a broad interpretation would result in “substantial uncertainty” for taxpayers and the IRS. A broad 
reading, under their view, would also have the potential to exclude all service businesses, in contravention 
of Congressional intent. This argument overreaches because the statute contains a qualifier such that the 
“principal asset” must be reputation or skill, thus, on its own terms, limiting the reach of the catch-all to 
certain types of service businesses. Although there is an administrative challenge to enforcing the statute as 
written, Treasury and the IRS have no discretion to abandon its clear language simply because the fact-based 
inquiry creates uncertainty to the taxpayers. Indeed, one administrable option would have been to interpret 
the owner’s portion of reputation and skill by formula, that is, deeming a normal rate of return of x percent 
to the business with any excess being deemed to be derived from reputation and skill. Lily Batchelder (@
lilybatch), Twitter (August 8, 2018, 11:11 Am), https://twitter.com/lilybatch/status/1027210665788940293.
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Rather than upholding Congressional intent, this regulation undermines it by providing 
high-income service providers a deduction for which they should have been ineligible 
under the statute. This contravenes the structure of Section 199A, which attempts to 
draw a distinction between businesses primarily based on reputation and skill (including 
the specifically enumerated ones) and other businesses.
Other examples of Treasury stretching the statute to accommodate lobbying interests 
include its implementation of the definition of “brokerage services,” which is listed in 
the statute as one of the industries disfavored under § 199A. The regulations carve out 
real estate brokers and insurance brokers from that term.48 Similarly, the regulations 
allow banks to qualify for § 199A by excluding deposits and making loans from the 
definition of “financial services,” which is another disfavored industry under the stat-
ute. In the Preamble, Treasury noted that this carve-out was in response to comments 
from taxpayers.49 
D. examples of Treasury Overreach from the Opportunity Zone Regulations
The TCJA’s opportunity zone provision lets investors defer capital gains on assets by 
“rolling” them into funds that make real estate investments in “opportunity zones” or 
areas that have been designated as low income.50 If investors meet certain requirements, 
they can receive tax-free basis on their assets and even permanently exempt the gains 
under certain circumstances. 
In order to further the provision’s purpose of revitalizing disadvantaged areas, the 
statute defines the scope of permissible investments that a fund can make to qualify 
for the tax advantages. Among the permissible investments are purchases of “qualified 
opportunity zone property.”51 The statute cross-references Section 179 to require that 
such purchases be from unrelated parties. The regulations, however, extend the defini-
tion to leases from related parties.52
The statute also requires that these investments either coincide with the “original use 
of the property” or “substantially improve” the property, which is defined as “additions 
to basis.”53 Basis is a tax concept that is defined as the original cost of property adjusted 
upward by capital expenditures made to the property and downward by depreciation 
deductions.54 Capital expenditures, in turn, are defined as “permanent improvements 
or betterments made to increase the value of any property.”55 The IRS has, in the resi-
dence context, illustrated this concept with the following examples: a home addition, 
replacing an entire roof, driveway paving, installing central air conditioning, or rewir-
ing your home. 
48 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(x).
49 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(ix). 
50 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2. 
51 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(i).
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-(2)(c).
53 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(D)(ii).
54 Id. at § 1016. 
55 Id. at § 263 and regulations thereunder. 
The New Tax Legislative and Regulatory Process 1153
Flouting the common understanding of basis and “permanent improvements,” includ-
ing its prior interpretations of the concept, in the opportunity zone context Treasury has 
expanded additions to basis beyond the statute to purchases of tangible property such 
as linens, mattresses, furniture, and gym equipment.56
Treasury went even further in creating a nonstatutory exception for vacant land. Con-
trary to the text of the statute, as well as the intent of Congress to improve low-income 
communities, vacant land need not satisfy the original use or substantial improvement 
test so long as the land is used in a trade or business or there is an intention to improve 
the land within 30 months of purchase.57 Treasury justified this statutory departure on 
policy grounds.
IV. POSSIBle PaThS fORWaRD
What does the future hold for the tax legislative and regulatory process in an era 
of reconciliation? Are there possible improvements we can make to reduce its more 
pathological tendencies? I explore some of these questions below. 
a. The legislative Process
Going forward, the sunsets of the 2017 bill will lead to more budgetary gamesman-
ship. Party polarization will also continue to put immense pressure on the estimates 
and the estimators. Although the budget rules ultimately held during the 2017 process, 
budget norms were destabilized, indicating points of vulnerability. 
One possible path to improve the reconciliation process would be to better align the 
Byrd rule with aims of deficit reduction. Sunset provisions and other budget gimmicks 
allow the circumvention of out-year deficit impact while still meeting the letter of the 
rule (Kysar, 2011, pp. 1007, 1028). Of particular importance is shoring up the budget 
baseline to ensure that parties do not toggle between one of current policy and one of 
current law in order to reenact unpaid-for temporary legislation (Kamin and Kysar, 2017; 
better.gop, 2016). A new baseline rule could assume provisions are temporary unless 
they were enacted for budgetary reasons, that is, unless they were enacted through a 
reconciliation bill (Kysar, 2020b, p. 86). 
Moreover, the Byrd rule’s prohibition on provisions that add to the deficit in out-years 
only works if the budget window is relatively short (Aprill and Hemel, 2018). In prior 
work, I have recommended different budget windows for varying purposes (Kysar, 
2020b, pp. 77–78). For budget rule purposes, for instance, a shorter budget window 
overcomes the practical difficulties of implementing longer estimates and the gaming 
opportunities presented by such a window. Estimators, however, could make use of 
longer-term projections outside of the official scores in order to glean a better picture 
of the long-term fiscal health of the nation (Kysar, 2020b, pp. 77–78).
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-2(b)(4)(iii)(D)(1).
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.1400Z2(d)-2(b)(4)(iv)(B)-(C).
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The instability of both the budget baseline and budget window can be traced to the 
fact that both of these important features of reconciliation can be altered by a simple 
majority vote, otherwise circumventing the supermajority rules of the Senate, by enact-
ing such change in the budget resolution. Another possible avenue is to change Senate 
procedure involving the budget resolution, requiring certain aspects of it to be subject 
to normal supermajority rules. This would go a long way to stabilizing the budget 
rules. 
Additional concerns stemming out of the 2017 process include the invocation of 
the Byrd rule for measures that would effectuate fiscal discipline, for instance, the 
aforementioned trigger mechanisms that purportedly ran afoul of the Byrd rule’s pro-
hibition on provisions with no budgetary impact. Additionally, the parliamentarian’s 
rulings with regard to subject matter limitations of the Byrd rule, at times, appear to 
be haphazard (Aprill and Hemel, 2018). Some of the frustration over these rulings can 
be traced to their nontransparency, which is justified by the parliamentarian’s need for 
insulation from politics. What we know about the parliamentarian’s rulings or reason-
ing surrounding them often only occurs from staff or senators who choose to share. 
Aprill and Hemel (2018) have recommended that Budget Committee staffers publish 
short summaries of how the senate parliamentarian ruled and the office’s rationales in 
applying the Byrd rule. This solution would balance political insulation with public 
accountability. 
More generally, the use of reconciliation for tax legislation itself poses risk. The par-
tisan and party-led process has the tendency to produce unstable legislation that lacks 
the expertise of the tax institutions. Reconciliation’s quick time frame also increases 
the chance for mistakes and ambiguities. As Treasury steps in to make sense of the 
legislation, this leaves room for private interests to capture the regulatory process. All 
of these dynamics occurred during the TCJA process. 
These features of reconciliation are particularly problematic when it comes to complex 
tax reform, which demands considered expertise to design and stability to effectuate its 
goals. Resurrecting an idea from the 1980s, reconciliation could be limited to changing 
tax rates rather than the tax base (Federal Bar Association, 1988, pp. 1581, 1583). A 
rates-only rule for reconciliation, however, may be overly broad since minor substantive 
tax legislation can withstand the limitations of the process. Moreover, once reconcilia-
tion becomes the norm for enacting tax legislation, as we have seen over the past two 
decades, it is difficult to put the genie back into the bottle.
Reconciliation’s capture of the tax legislative process, however, may be short-lived. 
Another major takeaway from the past two decades of tax lawmaking is that reconcili-
ation has been functioning as a release valve for the filibuster (Kysar, 2020b, p. 63). In 
many ways, it is allowing the filibuster to continue because there is less of a need to 
invoke the nuclear option in one of the most controversial and important policy areas. 
Since the judicial filibuster has steadily eroded over the years, a new majority in the 
Senate, however, may very well end the legislative filibuster, making minority rights 
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in the Senate a bygone era.58 If this occurs, the role of the budget process will greatly 
diminish. No majority will need to use reconciliation anymore to pass legislation across 
party lines, so the Byrd rule, as well as statutory pay-go rules, will have no teeth. 
What would tax legislation look like without the strictures of the budget process? 
There may, for instance, be no need for sunsets and other tax provisions inspired by 
the budget rules. The overall cost of legislation may, however, reach new heights, 
although it is certainly in dispute how successful reconciliation has been at achieving 
fiscal discipline (Aprill and Hemel, 2018). One potential mechanism to deal with the 
loss of the budget rules’ enforcement mechanism, either through the fall of the legisla-
tive filibuster or the choice not to use reconciliation for complex tax legislation, could 
be to bake budget goals into the statute, as opposed to enforcing them through process 
rules (Kysar, 2019, pp. 809, 867). Tax laws, for instance, could be pegged to a revenue 
goal. We have seen some experimentation with these types of mechanisms or “triggers” 
during the TCJA process.59 
Congress would find budgetary targets built into the substance of the law less easy 
to evade than the budget rules. 60 For instance, in the early 1980s, proposed legislation 
would have limited the amount of revenue lost to tax expenditures to no more than 30 
percent of the net revenues collected in the fiscal year.61 Although this was enforced 
through a procedural rule, one could imagine that a budget constraint such as this could 
be embedded within the substantive statute. If, for instance, the prior year’s revenues 
could dictate the total amount of tax expenditures available, then the tax expenditures 
could be automatically granted if the benchmarks were met (Kysar, 2019, p. 864). 
Reconstituting the policy role of the tax institutions is another important goal for 
improving the legislative process. One possible consequence of the fall of reconcili-
ation might possibly be to restore some primacy to the tax committees and the JCT. 
Reconciliation shifted power away from these committees into the hands of party 
leaders and the budget committees, making policy and technical expertise of the tax 
committees and other tax institutions less important. If the use of reconciliation falls 
58 In 2017, Senate Republicans deployed the nuclear option to remove the filibuster for Supreme Court 
nominees. Flegenheimer, Matt, “Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,” 
New York Times, April 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-
courtsenate.html. Senate Democrats have increasingly threatened doing the same for the legislative filibuster 
should they come to power.
59 Senate deficit hawks proposed to reverse the tax cuts in the TCJA if the law’s deficit impact turned out 
to be worse than advertised. Pramuk, Jacob, “Senate GOP Rushes to Change Tax Bill as Setback Hits 
Hours before Vote,” CNBC (November 30, 2017),  https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/parliamentarian-
says-revenue-trigger-in-gop-tax-plan-will-not-work-under-rules-of-senate.html. Ironically, the senate 
parliamentarian ruled that the trigger did not meet the Byrd rule requirement of having a budgetary impact 
(Aprill and Hemel, 2018).
60 These mechanisms could extend far beyond tax. For instance, in the Social Security context, benefits and 
taxes could be automatically adjusted if the system is projected to become insolvent (Kamin, 2014).
61 Tax Expenditure Limitation and Control Act of 1981, S. 193, 97th Cong.
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away with the filibuster, then the tax institutions could once again regain prominence. 
Although the JCT would still produce revenue estimates on tax bills, being freed from 
providing advice on various Byrd rule challenges may allow the committee to return to 
more policy analysis. Reduced emphasis on outlining the parameters of tax legislation 
in the initial budget resolution may also help to restore Treasury and the tax-writing 
committees to their agenda-setting role. That being said, if supermajority requirements 
in the Senate are removed, the promotion of party agenda without the need to win over 
the minority through vote trading may mean the continued sacrificing of tax policy 
goals for party goals. 
B. The Regulatory Process
The implementation of the TCJA illustrates grave problems with the regulatory process. 
It is tilted toward the well-resourced, who can influence Treasury’s interpretation from 
early stages. Moreover, existing standing doctrine ensures that there is no way to hold 
Treasury accountable when it goes beyond the statute in its implementation. Congress 
could do much more to improve the regulatory process and give Treasury the tools it 
needs to stave off industry influence, which I outline below. A cynic may counter that 
Congress prefers the current state of affairs precisely because it benefits business inter-
ests and, thus, may be unwilling to conduct agency oversight. Still, one can hope that 
although congressional members may be tempted to abet certain transfers of resources to 
industry, overall, they aim for transparency and good government. Implementing these 
principles ensures that individual members do not defect from that common, larger goal. 
Statutory Fixes and Power of the Purse. When possible, Congress could rescind 
Treasury’s misguided implementation of the law through clarification of the statute. 
The House and Senate could also pass a joint disapproval resolution striking down a 
particular regulation or set of regulations under the Congressional Review Act, so long 
as certain procedural requirements are met. Finally, Congress has, in the past, put in an 
appropriations bill a provision that no money can be spent on implementing a specific 
regulatory provision with which it disagrees.
Empower Federal Officials. One possible solution to the lack of standing to challenge 
Treasury and the IRS actions benefiting certain taxpayers would be a Congressional 
grant of power to an ombudsman, inspector general, or other federal official to bring 
suit against Treasury and the IRS for regulatory decisions that contravene statutory 
authority.62 Congress has taken such an approach in other circumstances.63 Since the 
62 See Graetz, Schenk, and Alstott (2018) introducing such an approach as a possibility; see also Sugin (2016) 
(suggesting an ombudsman, such as the Taxpayer Advocate, to monitor constitutional issues arising from 
tax regulation). 
63 See, for example, § 301 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb; Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 706-07, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-6. Another possible 
model is the cause of action given to the comptroller general in the event of an illegal impoundment. 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 687.
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United States has standing to bring criminal suits, it has been suggested that Article 
III standing does not require injury in fact and suits by appointed federal officials may 
meet the standing hurdles (Hartnett, 1999, pp. 2239, 2255–2258). Nonetheless, the 
constitutionality of this approach is unclear.
Improve the Regulatory Process. The failures of implementing the TCJA indicate a 
need to improve transparency in the rulemaking process. First, Congress could mandate 
that Treasury publicize any written comments it receives during the prenotice period 
as well as provide a record of in-person contacts with private parties if they pertain to 
the rulemaking process no matter if they occur pre or post notice (Oei and Osofsky, 
2019).64 Second, Congress could require Treasury to convene advisory councils that 
represent the public interest to assist Treasury in the rulemaking process.65 Relatedly, 
Congress could also expand the Taxpayer Advocate Service to have a more direct role 
in the formation of regulations (Book, 2012, pp. 517, 568–583). 
Making the Costs Transparent. One troubling aspect of regulatory giveaways to 
taxpayers is that they are never paid for. To the extent a regulation contravenes the 
statute, the cost of the rule will not be factored into the original JCT score of the leg-
islation. When Treasury promulgates the regulation, however, it then becomes law. 
For purposes of enforcing the budget rules, the new nonstatutory interpretation will be 
subsumed within the CBO baseline, which is primarily constructed from current law. 
This means that the cost of the taxpayer-friendly regulation will escape the budget 
process entirely.66 Congress could task the JCT with evaluating all Treasury and IRS tax 
guidance and producing a revenue estimate where that guidance is deemed significant. 
Congress could specify a threshold, such that guidance is deemed significant when it 
has an effect of greater than, say, $100 million on receipts or spending in either direc-
tion relative to the baseline.67 
Require Better Public Disclosure of Tax Liability. U.S. securities laws require detailed 
disclosure of the components of income tax expense that exceed 5 percent of their income 
before tax, multiplied by the applicable statutory tax rate.68 Many corporations, however, 
seem to be circumventing this rule by grouping GILTI liability with other expenses 
and benefits.69 Congress should use its oversight authority to ensure the Securities and 
64 At least one agency has adopted a policy that mandates that ex parte communications about pending rulemak-
ing be documented in writing in order to ensure transparency. McCoy, Patricia A., Comment of Financial 
Regulation and Consumer Protection Scholars and Former Regulators on Docket No. CFPB-2018-0009 33 
(June 7, 2018), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2018-0009-0121 (discussing 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) rulemaking process).
65 The CFPB has done this voluntarily. Id. 
66 Kamin and Kysar, 2017 (discussing the need for consistent baselines in ensuring the budget process captures 
the cost of legislation).
67 The $100 million threshold would match the threshold for “economically significant” regulatory action 
for purposes of OIRA review. 
68 17 C.F.R.§ 210.4-08(h)(1) (2018).
69 Eavis, Peter, “Why the Impact of the Trump Taxes Remains Partly Hidden,” New York Times (December 
30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/business/corporate-tax-cuts-impact.html.
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Exchange Commission is enforcing this provision adequately. Alternatively, Congress 
could make a statutory rule requiring disclosure of tax liability under the TCJA’s base 
erosion provisions. This would allow scrutiny of whether the new regime is working 
as intended and whether Treasury’s implementation of it is overly generous.
Delegate Less. Treasury’s implementation of the TCJA should serve as a cautionary 
tale to Congress in rushing complex tax legislation through the reconciliation process. 
The interpretive challenges underscore the necessity for Congress to slow down the 
process and legislate with more precision. It also serves to highlight the dangers in 
delegating broadly to Treasury without at least tightening the regulatory process. The 
lack of representation of the public interest, transparency, and budget accountability, 
along with the inability for taxpayers to challenge improper revenue-losing regulations, 
means that the process will inevitably be weighted toward special interests. This exac-
erbates already existing problems with the tax legislative process. These insights call 
into question recent suggestions that Congress should make greater use of delegation in 
the tax context, for instance, by delegating rate changes to Treasury or an independent 
body such as the Federal Reserve (Hines and Logue, 2015, p. 235). Rather than delegate 
broadly to Treasury, the TCJA regulatory process suggests that Congress should reassert 
its primary role over tax lawmaking. 
Less delegation would require more precise statutory drafting.70 Although this would 
seem to implicate the classic rules versus standards debate, weighing costs of drafting 
against costs of application (Kaplow, 1992, pp. 557–629), Congress can still draft leg-
islation that is adaptive to circumstances while being precise in its contours. Moreover, 
my recommendations do not forestall all delegation, of course, but it is vitally important 
that Congress guards its taxing and spending powers carefully in order to maintain ways 
to rein in the executive. In deciding how much to delegate to Treasury, Congress should 
recognize that delegation carries particular risks given the pathologies of the regula-
tory process in the tax context. In particular, Congress should guard its prerogatives 
over major policy decisions and should draft tax legislation carefully in order to avoid 
inadvertent delegation. These suggestions comport with the constitutional framework 
of entrusting Congress with special duties over taxation.71 
V. CONClUSION 
The TCJA marks the culmination of a new era of tax lawmaking that has been two 
decades in the making. Reconciliation has become the preferred vehicle of choice for 
both simple and complex tax legislation, although it is particularly ill-suited for the latter 
given the partisan and truncated manner in which it operates. These features produce 
precarious and flawed legislation, which is particularly problematic for achieving true 
tax reform. Moreover, as Treasury must step in to fix and interpret the legislation, it 
70 Note that more precise statutory drafting would not solve the problem of Treasury interpreting against 
clear statutory language, which is a democratic concern of greater proportions. 
71 Kysar (2013, p. 1) tracing the history of the Origination Clause. 
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succumbs to business interests due to deficiencies in the regulatory process and litiga-
tion dynamics. The new era, however, may be short-lived as the Senate seems poised 
to eliminate the legislative filibuster in the near future, making reconciliation obsolete. 
This will certainly create new challenges for tax legislation. Until then, there are ways 
to improve upon the legislative and regulatory process in its current incarnation. 
Since the birth of the nation, taxation and democracy have been closely intertwined. 
The manner in which tax laws are made and implemented should aim to preserve, not 
sever that connection. Congress should strive to improve upon budget rules so that they 
better effectuate their goals without supplanting traditional tax policy aims. Congress 
should also give Treasury the tools it needs to weigh the public interest against private 
ones. Most importantly, Congress should take ownership over its duty to the polity in 
providing clear, comprehensive, and reasoned tax legislation, without overly delegating 
to an overburdened and unelected agency. 
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